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ABSTRACT
The presence of organized crime is common across all income levels, but the
effects of organized crime differ between low-income and middle-income countries.
Institutionally, socially, and economically, criminal organizations make contributions
which affect the states they are in. This paper theorizes that the contributions made by
organized crime help development in low-income countries, then later harms
development in middle-income countries. Empirical tests find that the direct effects of
organized crime are not significant in low and middle-income countries. The indirect
effects of organized crime – corruption in the public sector — have a negative effect on
development.
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INTRODUCTION
As of 2018, 75% of the world’s population live in middle-income countries. Most
of the world's countries have been able to develop out of low-income status, but are now
stuck in the middle, unable to develop into high-income. This phenomenon is referred to
as the Middle Income Trap, or MIT (Glawe & Wagner, 507). This paper builds off
theories of MITs presented in Glawe and Wagner (2016) and assumes factors that help
development in low-income countries (LICs) do not affect development in the same way
in middle-income countries (MICs). The factor this study looks at specifically is
organized crime. I argue organized crime can positively influence the development of
LICs, and with the same mechanisms, negatively influence the development of MICs.
LICs and MICs require different factors of development to be emphasized in
order to advance. Economic freedom and informal institutions are traditional contributing
factors for development in LICs (Medina-Moral & Montes-Gan 2018). Economic
freedom allows for things such as trade openness, savings, and population growth that
encourage both economic and human development. Social organization also leads to
advancement (Acemoglu & Robinson 2006). In LICs, organization often comes from
informal institutions. Informal institutions exist alongside formal institutions, and
consists of rules and norms enforced by the consensus of the population. Informal
institutions may have an exaggerated role in places where formal institutions are still
developing. While informal institutions may not directly become formal institutions, they
do influence who has power and what the population considered important. Informal

2
institutions are often more persistent than formal ones, and can undermine them
(Pansters, 2018). One way organized crime sets up informal institutions is by establishing
their own market system with trade networks and an informal economy to support their
illegal activities. Especially in LICs, criminal organizations are able to reach sections of
the population the state cannot. Either the population is geographically isolated, or not
considered a priority enough to allocate the state’s limited resources to. In these cases,
organized crime offers public goods and services in place of the state. Organized crime
can also establish and enforce rules within a society. These may be social or economic
rules, such as protecting private property -- and they again make up the informal
institutions that may compete with formal institutions as the state develops and expands
its reach. Through their illegal activities, organized crime can help develop an organized
labor force as well as build up human capital. In places with little organization and few
legitimate employment opportunities, organized crime creates an informal economy that
financially supports people and increases trade. These help develop a labor force and
build up human capital by offering employment opportunities where there may otherwise
be none.
For further development in MICs, the literature points to improved governance
and state capacity as significant factors. Improved governance includes establishing
higher government effectiveness, regulation, better legal systems, higher property rights,
and more political stability (Medina-Moral & Montes-Gan 2018). Organized crime has a
vested interest in stopping these items and will work actively to make the state less
effective in these areas. As such, we should expect MICs with high organized crime to
have less capacity to continue developing. Additionally, the contributions made by
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organized crime to development in the low-income stage mean obstacles to further
development are already in place. The informal institutions set by organized crime may
compete with or undermine formal institutions, and the informal economy or black
market is difficult to tax and regulate. Formal institutions established with the presence of
organized crime may have high levels of corruption, which further impedes
development.
This study finds the direct effects of organized crime are not significant,
regardless of income level. An additional indicator of organized crime which captures the
indirect effects, ethics and corruption, has negative effects on development in both LICs
and MICs. These results point to governance being a more important factor in
development than trade in LICs and MICs, despite what the literature
argues. Additionally, this paper does not find support for organized crime helping the
development of LICs, but does find evidence organized crime harms the development of
MICs.
The following paper outlines the differences between development in low and
middle-income countries in more detail, a section on how organized crime contributes to
development, a research design, findings and a conclusion.
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THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LOW-INCOME AND MIDDLE-INCOME
For the current fiscal year of 2020, the World Bank defines low-income as
economies with a GNI per capita of $1,025 or less, and middle-income as economies with
a GNI per between $1,026 and $12,375. Each year these classifications are adjusted to
accurately capture each lending group. Table 1 shows how income classifications have
changed over the time period of this study.
Table 1.

World Bank Income Group Classifications 2008- 2018

Year

2008

2010

Low income

<=
975

<=
1,005 <= 1,035 <= 1,045 <= 1,005 <= 1,025

2012

2014

2016

2018

Lower middle income

9763,855

1,0063,975

1,0364,085

1,0464,125

1,0063,955

1,0263,995

Upper middle income

3,85611,905

3,97612,275

4,08612,615

4,12612,735

3,95612,235

3,99612,375

High income

>
> 11,905 12,275 > 12,615 > 12,735 > 12,235 > 12,375

Countries move up income levels as their institutions improve and the state gains
more capacity. Medina-Moral and Montes-Gan (2018) argue specific institutions increase
economic and social performance in different stages of development. The authors group
countries into clusters of development-- less developed, intermediate, and advanced, then
compare the countries’ status between 1996 and 2011. Successful countries are ones that
have moved from either less developed to intermediate, or from intermediate to
advanced, in that time. Measurements are based on a combination of GNI and HDI.
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The authors find less developed countries had the worst scores in the legal system,
property rights, rule of law, and government effectiveness. This finding indicates that a
lack of governance hinders development. Intermediate countries scored better in
governance and democracy. The authors find freedom to international trade to be the
most important factor in a less developed country's advancement. In intermediate
countries, good governance is the most significant factor in development. Countries that
were the most successful were the ones able to adopt good institutions around economic
freedom and governance. These included access to international trade, government
effectiveness, regulation, legal frameworks and property rights, political stability, and
rule of law. Based on these results, less developed countries are more likely to develop
when they prioritize economic freedom early on.
The likelihood of development also depends on institutions and social choices.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) address development by creating a framework around
how and why democracy does, or does not, consolidate in developing countries. While
economic development is not as closely tied to democratization as once believed (Olson,
1993; Alamdari, 1994), democratic institutions are still a significant factor in a country's
ongoing development, should they be well designed and implemented (Tarverdi, Seha &
Campbell, 2019). Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2006) main argument is democracy
consolidates when elites do not have a strong incentive to overthrow it. Incentives are
determined by the strength of civil society, the structure of political institutions, the
nature of political and economic crises, the level of economic inequality, the structure of
the economy, and the form and extent of globalization.
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These determinants outline conditions that help countries develop. Civil society
contributes to development as a well-organized population is necessary for positive
changes in institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006, p. 31). The structure of these
political institutions determines how much influence the elite have over the population
and whether or not repression is a viable option (p. 33). Conditions outside the control of
the state or the population also influence the course of development. Times of political or
economic crises, and the nature of these crises, change how society and the state interact
(p. 31). Likewise, the level of economic inequality also changes this interaction.
Increased inequality corresponds with an increased revolutionary threat (p. 35).
Additional determinants are the structure of the economy and the form and extent of
globalization. These two determinants influence sources of income and how costly
repression versus concessions is to the elite.
While Medina-Moral and Montes-Gen (2018) argue trade is the most important
factor in development for LICs and that governance is more important in MICs, that does
not mean governance is not also important in LICs. This is something Acemoglu and
Robinson (2006) touch on in their framework of democracy with political institutions
(34). However, many LICs simply lack the capacity to govern all of the population.
When that is the case, often extra-legal authorities emerge to fill the vacuum left by the
state. de Oliveria and Penev (2011) pose that the buildup of globalization and the current
method of governance has led to new forms of authority in states. These include sub-state
actors on local levels, but also non-state actors taking on roles previously held by the
state. Organized crime is one such non-state actor which, given the right circumstances,
may emerge as an alternative authority to the state.
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According to the authors, states that have broken up social relations or areas of
contested sovereignty are most likely to have extra-legal authorities taking on roles
traditionally held by the state. Other characteristics that lead to a power vacuum are low
levels of state legitimacy, territorial vulnerability, privileged or dominant elites as well as
little economic and social provision for the population, underdeveloped social
institutions, and a high level of corruption. Taken together, these factors present low
levels of governance. Most often, these types of states are located in the Global South.
In addition to increased globalization, since the end of the Cold War, organized
crime has become more centralized and more organized. Increased regulation in states
has provided an incentive for criminal organizations to increase their capacity and expand
their activities. Now many operate with a centralized structure in a defined, but
changeable, territory outside the reach of the state. This autonomy combined with
organization has allowed criminal enterprises to assume the role of an authority over the
population where the state is lacking. While the state also has an organizational structure
and some level of capacity, formal governments are a lot more restricted than criminal
organizations. The state develops while being responsible for the whole country at once,
as well as being responsible to standards set by international observers. Criminal
organizations emerge where and when there is opportunity, without the rigidity of being a
formal government. In order to carry out their goals of illicit profit, organized crime
naturally assumes a role of power wherever they are. Organized crime also naturally
takes advantage of networks of kinship, clan, and ethnic and social ties. This undermines
the monopoly of power and authority the state should have over the population. In places
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where the state is unable to enforce its authority, organized crime may take advantage of
that absence and become an extra-legal authority for the population.
While filling the vacuum left by the state, organized crime offers public goods to
the population. Though organized crime exists primarily for the economic gain of those
perpetuating it, Skaperdas (2001) explains how organized crime can interact with the
population and offer a type of support when the state cannot.
Organized crime emerges from a particular set of conditions -- regime change or
revolution, prohibition, geographic isolation, and ethnic and social distance from the
center of political decision making. All of these conditions represent an area that is not
addressed by the state. With geographic isolation, places the state cannot or will not exert
the energy to control allow for organized crime to emerge and fill in that role. With
prohibition, any illicit goods or services with a high demand is attractive to organized
crime. In this case, there is a need for an organizational structure and supply chain to
deliver those goods or services and efficiently collect the profits. In a state of prohibition,
organized crime steps in and becomes the unofficial channel to complete this process. In
times of major political change, established institutions are often dismantled by the new
regime, and the new ones take time to come into effect. This time allows organized crime
to emerge as a power within the population. Finally, ethnic or social distance alienates a
part of the population from the state authority or from society. From this, organized crime
often emerges as an authority for this particular population.
Out of these conditions, organized crime exhibits primitive state functions
(Fiorentini, 2009; Sung, 2004). In order to conduct their business, criminal organizations
establish rules and enforce contracts, roughly equaling the rule of law. It also builds up a
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market structure within the informal economy. In order to maintain their hold on the
population, criminal organizations give out public goods such as protection and limited
financial support. Essentially, organized crime will provide public goods and services in
place of the state, but it will come at a much higher cost to the population.
The previous literature establishes that LICs need a market structure and internal
organization in order to develop, and that the state cannot always provide those factors. In
places where low income states cannot reach, organized crime is able to fill the vacuum
by organizing the population, building up a market, and offering public goods. While this
is helpful to LICs, MICs require different factors of development in order to keep
advancing. As MICs have developed out of LICs, it is assumed middle-income states
already have some degree of economic freedom, informal institutions, and social
organization. These factors are essentially prerequisites for a country to reach middleincome status. Once in the middle-income stage, it is important for countries to start
emphasizing other factors of development. The following literature outlines what those
factors are and how organized crime contributes to development in MICs.
Countries develop from LICs to MICs by establishing economic and social
institutions that bring in revenue and organize the population (Medina-Moral & MontesGen, 2018; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006) Given the fact that few countries have been
able to develop to high-income status, development in MICs is much more difficult.
Economic and social institutions must be improved or changed, and improved
governance becomes highly important.
Agenor, Canuto, and Jelenic (2012) explain how a sharp deceleration in growth is
common among countries that reach the middle middle-income stage of development,
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referred to as the Middle Income Trap, or MIT. MITs are characterized by decreased
growth with contrasting increasing productivity, a rate of stable but low growth, and
stagnant innovation where talent is routinely misallocated. According to the authors,
improving access to advanced infrastructure, enhancing the protection of property rights,
and reforming the labor market to reduce rigidity counteracts MITs.
While LICs are able to develop by relying on labor intensive, low cost
manufacturing based on imported technology, as the economy develops this system
becomes less sustainable (Agenor et. al, 2012). Companies become more competitive,
labor becomes less abundant, and wages become higher leading to a slow rate of growth.
The solution to the MIT is to innovate and invest in different places. The authors
recommend states early on pursue public policies aimed at improving access to advanced
infrastructure such as high high-speed communication networks. These facilitate the
spread of information and innovation. Better protection of property rights also advances
innovation. Lastly, reformed labor markets allow people to seek higher education and not
be dependent on factory work. These measures begin to discontinue the misallocation of
talent and again foster innovation.
Low cost labor and manufacturing may help LICs develop, but in MICs, there
needs to be more focus on innovation in order to continue developing. This means states
need to pursue policies that change the market structure and allow the population to
receive more education. These changes are not necessarily supported by organized
crime.
Organized crime’s primary purpose is economic gain; therefore, it naturally
brings in wealth and positively contributes to economic development. However, it is
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organized crime’s negative contribution to governance that harms development,
particularly in MICs. van Dijk (2007) explores the relationship between organized crime
and the state while looking at the effects of organized crime on the rule of law,
corruption, and the net wealth of countries. The author finds while organized crime has
some ability to bring in wealth through its illicit activities, the negative effects of
organized crime on governance undermines this addition to the economy. The author
emphasizes how important good institutions are to economic development. Good
governance leads to economic development, a professional police force, good rule of law,
and an independent judiciary are more likely to lead to advancement than a sudden
economic boost or foreign aid. The presence of organized crime then has negative effects
on governance. There is a close link between organized crime and corruption, both in the
police force and in the government in general. In such cases, the undue influence of
organized crime hampers good governance and development.
Despite its negative effect on governance, organized crime may in some cases
have a positive effect on the economy. Illicit trafficking often brings in a large amount of
revenue to the formal and informal economy, as does rent seeking and money laundering.
Van Dijk (2007) finds some middle middle-income countries, particularly in Latin
America, would have far less wealth and may still be classified as low income without
the contributions made by organized crime. Though overall, organized crime has negative
effects on human development as well as a stronger negative effect of GDP (Uger &
Dasgupta, 2011).
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THREE AREAS OF CONTRIBUTION
Organized crime interacts with and contributes to its social and economic
environment (Van de Bunt, Siegal & Zaitch, 2014). In terms of development, organized
crime has three main areas of contribution: institutional, social, and economic. Criminal
organizations make these contributions at any income level, but the effects are different
across income levels. This paper argues organized crimes effects are positive to
development in LICs, and harmful to development in MICS.
Institutionally
Organized crime functions as an extra legal authority, it builds up informal
institutions and establishes rules and norms for the population. Criminal organizations are
able to do this as they have a high degree of organization and an interest in maintaining
their environment. In places where the state cannot reach the population, organized crime
takes advantage of this vacuum by offering public goods and setting rules and norms.
While criminal organizations services come at a much higher cost that the states would
(Skaperdas, 2001), they are still able to be used to set up political and economic rules.
And although informal institutions set up by criminal organizations skirt legality, and do
not directly translate to formal institutions, they still work to order and organize the
population. In LICs, this is a positive contribution as organized crimes’ informal
institutions offer support where the low capacity formal state does not (Yahagi, 2017). In
MICs, informal institutions set up by organized crime contribute negatively to
development as they undermine formal institutions, bring corruption into institutions, and
generally harm good governance (van Dijk, 2007).
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An example of the institutional contributions of organized crime is the history of
drug cartels in Mexico. When Mexico was a low-income one-party state in the late 1900s,
rural populations had little contact with the formal government. In this vacuum, the needs
not being met by the state were met by informal institutions backed by cartels.
Employment opportunities, loans, security – were all provided through informal
channels. Once Mexico’s ruling party left power in 1994, there was a greater state
presence in rural areas. Still, cartels were still active and informal institutions persist
(Pansters, 2018). The extra-legal authority of drug cartels helped Mexico as a LIC, and
how harms it as a MIC.
Socially
There is a high degree of interaction between organized crime and the social
environment. Criminal organizations take advantage of and build upon existing social
structures (Van de Bunt et. al, 2014). As part of their embeddedness in society, criminal
organizations use societal connections in order to conduct business. As their business
expands, so do social networks. Additionally, criminal organizations have a high degree
of internal organization. When dealing with the population, this organization is
influential. It is important for the survival of organized crime to maintain organization
and social cohesion, therefore when dealing with outsiders the same rules would be
applied (Kleemans & Van de Bunt,1999). In LICs, social embeddedness is a positive
contribution, as organized crime helps organize the population and expand social
networks. However, in MICs the social aspect of organized crime is harmful as parts of
the population become tied to illegal activities and the legal institutions that regulate the
social order may be corrupted or ineffective (Buscaglia & van Dijk, 2003). Additionally,
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organized crime has a vested interest in hindering effective governance, which inevitably
has a negative impact on society.
The social aspect of organized crime is best seen in Italy. While Italy is a HIC,
organized crime is historically embedded within the social environment – particularly in
the southern regions (Bascaglia & van Dijk, 20017. p. 7). Organized crime is a
recognized force for organization in Italy, and is perhaps the reason the southern regions
are consistently out-performed by the northern regions economically (Skaperdas, 2001).
Economically
Establishing an informal economy and trading illegal goods for economic gain is
the primary function of criminal organizations. They build up markets and trading where
there is some demand not being met by official entities, usually based on illegal goods
and services (Skaperdas, 2001). In fact, unemployment and low economic opportunity are
some of the main drivers of organized crime (Ruth, 2014). When formal economic
opportunity is lacking, that demand is filled by organized crime and the informal
economy. In LICs, the informal economy brings in revenue and employment (Buscaglia
& van Dijk, 2003). These benefits do not last to MICs, however, as the informal economy
cannot be taxed or regulated, hindering development (Shelley, 1998).
An example of the economic effects of organized crime is in Ukraine, a country
where shortly after their independence in 1987, an estimated 50% of the economy was
informal (Shelley, 1998). Ukraine’s GDP rapidly increased between 1999 and 2008, and
the country is now firmly stuck in the lower-middle-income category (Ricciardi et. al,
2020).
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Table 2 summarizes each contribution and how the effects are different at the two
different income levels.
Table 2.

Organized Crime’s Areas of Contribution

Organized Crime’s
contribution

How it helps develop LIC

How it harms develop
MIC

Institutional: Functions as Establishes informal
extra-legal authorities
institutions

Undermines and corrupts
government formal
institutions

Social: Interacts with
environment

Organizes population and
expands social networks

Captures population,
impedes legal institutions

Economic: Establishes
informal economy

Brings in revenue,
encourages trade and offers
employment

Cannot tax or regulate

From this, I develop the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: In low-income countries, increased organized crime corresponds to
increased development
As discussed above, organized crime enables LICs to advance to middle-income
status by establishing informal institutions, playing ordering roles in the population, and
building up an informal economy. However, these same effects are constraining in MICs
as it inhibits the state institutions necessary to further promote economic growth. As
such, I expect the opposite effect in MICs for my second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: In middle-income countries, increased organized crime corresponds
to decreased development.
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DATA AND METHODS
To test the aforementioned hypotheses, this study uses multivariate Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) regressions. Models are tested on 26 LICs, and 70 MICs from 2008
to 2018.
Dependent Variable
HDI is used to capture human development. HDI is a summary measure of three
key dimensions of human development: life expectancy at birth, education, and gross
national income per capita. The scores of each dimension are aggregated into a composite
index. HDI is useful to capture development in this study as it incorporates outcomes
from multiple institutions and areas of life.
GDP per capita is included to represent economic development. Data is taken
from the World Bank International Comparison Program. This indicator is used
specifically to capture how trade and business changes between income levels.
Independent Variable
The GCI measure of organized crime is the measure I employ to capture the direct
effects of organized crime. This indicator measures the response to the survey question
“In your country, to what extent does organized crime (mafia-oriented racketeering,
extortion) impose costs on businesses?”. The GCI codes this indicator from 1 to 7, a 1
being to a great extent, and a 7 being it imposes no costs. This indicator is included in
order to capture the direct effects of the most sophisticated and well-organized criminal
organizations, which have the highest capacity to act as extra-legal authorities. This is a
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good measure as it specifically deals with organized crime’s operations in the private
sector.
The GCI measure of ethics and corruption is also included to better represent the
indirect effects of organized crime on governance. Corruption and ethics is a composite
measure of responses to questions around the diversion of public funds, public trust in
politicians, and irregular payments and bribes. A value of 1 represents high corruption, 7
is low corruption. This measure is useful to capture organized crime in the public sector.
Due to its informal and secretive nature, the concept of organized crime is
difficult to measure. It is possible the GCI measures of organized crime and corruption
are in some ways unreliable. However, it is generally recognized in the scholarly
community that the GCI’s survey data provides the best available empirical measures of
organized crime.
Control Variable
Population size is included as a control for the effects of country size on
development. The data is taken from World Bank reports from 2008 to 2018. It is made
up of census reports from national statistical offices, Eurostat Demographic Statistics, the
United Nations Statistical Division, the Population and Vital Statistics Report, the U.S.
Census Bureau International Database, and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community
Statistics and Demography Programme (Ricciardi et. al, 2020).
Polity (Polity2) is used to capture the effects of regime type on development and
organized crime. Polity measures if a country is democratic or authoritarian on a scale
from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). Polity2 standardizes Polity
for time series analysis (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers, 2019).
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Durable is used as a proxy measure for conflict in order to control for the effect
conflict and violence has on developing countries. Durable is a running measure of the
durability of a regimes authority that represents the number of years since the last
substantive change in authority characteristics (Marshall et. al, 2019) This is a useful
control as it focuses on regime change -- which disrupts institutions, and does not include
general conflict -- which interacts with organized crime and could skew results.
Table 3 outlines the mean, range, and number of observations for each variable
and each income class.
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Table 3.
Variable

HDI

GDP per
capita

Organized
Crime

Variable Descriptions
Mean All Incomes

Range All Incomes

Number of Observations

(Mean Low-Income)

(Range Low-Income)

(Number Low-Income)

(Mean MiddleIncome)

(Range Middle-Income)

(Number MiddleIncome)

0.71

0.35 to 0.95

1423

(0.48)

(0.45 to 0.66)

(260)

(0.69)

(0.45 to 0.84)

(703)

14,989.39

198.3529 to 118,823.65

1401

(737.6748)

(198.3529 to 1602.4035)

(260)

(5,365.792)

(802.5180 to 16,377.00)

(692)

5.00

1.53 to 6.91

1423

(4.57)

(2.91 to 6.88)

(260)

(4.60)

(1.53 to 6.76)

(703)

1.5 to 6.5

1423

(1.7 to 5.7)

(260)

(1.5 to 5.3)

(703)

Ethics and 3.5
Corruption (2.8)
(3.1)
Population 50,079,421
Size
(23,748,756)
(74,409,052)

488,650 to 1,392,730,000 1423
(1,689,285 to
152,764,676)

(260)
(703)

(517,123 to
1,392,730,000)
Polity2

Durable

5

-10 to 10

1423

(2.2)

(-9 to 9)

(260)

(4.7)

(-9 to 10)

(703)

31.46

0 to 209

1423

20

(4.57)

(0 to 55)

(260)

(4.60)

(0 to 99)

(703)
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FINDINGS
The following models test the relationships between organized crime and
development at different income levels. Model 1 tests the dependent variable HDI with
the independent variables organized crime and ethics and corruption in low-income
countries. Model 2 also includes low income, but tests the dependent variable GDP per
capita, representing democracy, against organized crime and ethics and corruption.
Model 3 and model 4 represent middle-income countries and test the independent
variables against HDI and GDP per capita, respectively.
Model 1.

Term

estimate

intercept
0.408
organized_crime 0.003
Ethics/corruption 0.023
polity2
0.003
durable
-0.002
population_size
0
R_squared

HDI in Low-Income Countries

std_error

t-statistic

p_value

0.027
0.007
0.008
0.001
0.001
0

15.02
0.44
2.814
2.348
-3.022
1.465

0
0.661
0.005
0.02
0.003
0.144

0.099

Model 1 shows that organized crime is not a statistically significant factor in HDI.
However, ethics and corruption is significant at the .01 level. Meaning, as corruption
becomes less prevalent, HDI increases. The control variables are also insignificant.
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Model 2.

term

estimate

intercept
Organized_crime
ethics/corruption
polity2
durable
population_size
R_squared

442.4
107.2
57.38
5.72
-2
0

GDP per capita in Low-Income Countries

std_error
111.3
28.91
33.21
4.759
2.471
0

t-statistic
3.976
3.707
-1.728
1.204
-0.81
-1.23

p_value
0
0
0.085
0.32
0.419
0.22

0.051

Both direct and indirect effects of organized crime are significant and positive
factors for GDP per capita in LICs. Lower levels of organized crime and ethics and
corruption are strongly correlated with increases in GDP per capita. This model
contradicts hypothesis 1, which says that in LICs organized crime should help
development. Interestingly, neither regime type nor durability is significant for GDP per
capita.
Model 3.

term

HDI in Middle-Income Countries

estimate

std_error

intercept
organized_crime
ethics/ corruption
polity2
durable
population_size

0.581
0.004
0.024
0.002
0.001
0

0.021
0.004
0.006
0.001
0
0

R_squared

0.08

t-statistic
28.2
0.924
4.12
3.044
3.182
-3.111

p_value
0
0.356
0
0.002
0.002
0.002

Model 3 moves on to middle-income countries, where organized crime is again
not significant. Ethics and corruption is significant at the .05 level, meaning less
corruption leads to an increase in HDI. In this model the control variables are also
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significant, showing long lasting democracies are positively correlated with increased
HDI.
Model 4.

term

estimate

intercept
organized_crime
ethics/corruption
polity2
durable
population_size

988.4
267.4
705.6
76.79
35.19
0

R_squared

0.084

GDP per capita in Middle-Income Countries

std_error
826.6
170.7
231.2
27.7
8.528
0

t-statistic

p_value

1.196
1.566
3.052
2.772
4.127
-3.084

0.232
0.118
0.002
0.006
0
0.002

In model 4, ethics and corruption is significant for GDP per capita, but organized
crime is not. This mixed result offers mixed support for hypothesis 2, as corruption
negatively effects development but organized crime has no effect. The significance of
polity 2 and durable shows that long lasting democracies are associated with higher levels
of GDP per capita.
The direct effects of organized crime is only significant in one model, GDP per
capita in LICs. However, the indirect measure of organized crime on governance, ethics
and corruption, is significant in every model. This shows that regardless of income level,
governance is a key factor in development. These results somewhat supported hypothesis
2, that organized crime should hinder development in MICs. The results do not find any
support for hypothesis 1, that organized crime should help development in LICs.
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CONCLUSION
This paper tests how organized crime affects the development of low and middleincome countries, assuming factors the affect one income group have different effects in
the other. While economic freedom and informal institutions are traditionally the drivers
of development in LICs, MICs require more emphasis on good governance to advance
(Medina-Moral & Montes-Gan, 2018). Good governance is more difficult to establish in
LICs, as there are often sections of population beyond the reach if the state where, due to
the vacuum left by the state, organized crime operates as an informal institution to order
the population (de Olivera & Penev, 2011). Along with informal institutions, criminal
organizations establish informal economies which offer a source of revenue and
employment for a part of the population (van Dijk, 2007).
For good or ill, organized crime contributes to the environment in three ways-institutionally, socially, and economically. Institutionally, criminal organizations
establish informal institutions which set rules and norms for the population. These rules
and norms are helpful in LICs, but harmful in MICs as they undermine and corrupt
formal institutions. Socially, organized crime works to organize the population and
expand social networks. While offering social organization in LICs is a positive
contribution, in MICs organization from criminals entraps the population and hinders
legal institutions. Economically, organized crime brings in revenue and employment by
establishing a formal economy-- behavior which helps the trade focused aspects of LIC
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development. However, the informal economy hinders development in MICs as it cannot
be regulated or taxed.
In order to apply this framework empirically, this study tests the effects of mafia
type organized crime and a measure of ethics and corruption in the public sphere against
development, measured with HDI and GDP per capita. In nearly every case organized
crime is not significant to development, with the exception of a strong positive
correlation with GDP per capita in LICs. In all models, ethics and corruption have a
significant positive correlation with development, for both HDI and GDP per capita. As
ethics and corruption is the indicator used to capture the indirect effects on governance
from organized crime, its significance shows governance is important regardless of
income level.
Organized crime does not positively affect development in low-income countries
as this study hypothesized. In almost all tests, it is insignificant. In middle-income
countries, less organized crime and ethics and corruption leads to more development. It is
possible organized crime has a positive or negative effect on certain institutions in LICs
that is significant, which would constitute further research.
This paper follows an assumption laid out in literature on the middle income trap
(Galawe & Wagner, 2016) that factors of development have differing effects at different
income levels, and that the difference in effect explains why so few middle-income
countries advance to high income. By finding organized crime to be insignificant, this
paper rules out organized crime as a factor that positively contributes to development in
low-income countries. Meaning the negative effects of organized crime in middle income
countries have little to do with the development process.
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Based on the literature, it is still probable that factors such as economic freedom,
informal institutions, and social organization positively effect a countries ability to
further develop. This study only found that organized crime contribution to these
developmental factors is not significant.
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APPENDIX A
Organized Crime and High-Income Countries
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This paper assumes organized crime’s contributions to LICs continued to hinder
development in MICs. However, HICs are already developed, so the effects of organized
crime on development are moot. Given most HICs have a high capacity and reach among
the population, it is more likely in HICs the state has an effect on organized crime -- not
the other way around. This appendix tests the effect of development on organized crime
in and speculates how the organized crime behaves differently in HICs.
The three areas of contributions are different in HICs compared to LICs and
MICs. Presumably, institutions should already be established and be able to reach the
whole population, leaving no room for organized crime to act as extra-legal authorities
outside of very specific circles. Formal institutions at this income level will present as a
challenge to criminal organizations, having the capacity to override the informal
institutions of organized crime in most cases. Corruption will still be present, but should
be at a lower rate than in LICs or MICs.
While in HICs organized crime is still embedded within the population, it does
not have the same ordering roles as it does in LICs and MICs. Theoretically, criminal
organizations act as an organizing force and social network in lieu of legal channels, as it
does with the other areas as well. But in HICs, there are legitimate social networks and
social movements which may be used at a much lower cost than taking part in the social
aspects of organized crime. Essentially, there is social competition in HICs that does not
exist in LICs.
HICs, being high-income, have much larger sources of revenue than the other two
income groups. As such, the revenue associated with organized crime is insignificant-both to the population and to the state. The majority of citizens do not need to turn to the
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informal economy to survive, and the lost revenue from not being able to tax the informal
economy is not large enough to affect the economy of HICs. Instead, the amount of trade
should influence the amount of organized crime, reverse of what was expected in LICs
and MICs.
Table 4.

High-Income Variable Descriptions

Variable

Mean

Range

Number of Observations

HDI

0.87

0.78 to 0.95

460

GDP per capita

37,796.17

11,527.59 to 118,823.65

449

Organized Crime

5.75

4.00 to 6.90

460

Ethics and Corruption

4.56

2.0 to 6.5

460

Population Size

27,779,946

488,650 to 327,167,434

460

Polity2

6.6

-10 to 10

460

As shown in table 4, on average HICs have an organized crime value of 5.75,
compared to MICs 4.60 and LICs 4.57. This means business costs of organized crime are
lower in HICs than the other two income groups. Ethics and corruption is also lower in
HICs, with a value of 4.56 compared to MICs 3.05 and LICs 2.84.
In order to capture the effect of development on organized crime, in this appendix
independent and dependent variables are reversed. The dependent variables are now the
GCI measures of organized crime and ethics and corruption. The independent variables
are HDI and GDP per capita.
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Model 5.

Organized Crime in High-Income Countries

term

estimate

std_error

t-statistic

intercept
hdi
gdp_per_cap
polity2
durable
population_size

1.354
5.184
0
-0.046
0.001
0

0.802
0.991
0
0.005
0.001
0

1.689
5.233
3.407
-9.635
1.515
-9.041

R_squared

p_value
0.092
0
0.001
0
0.131
0

0.395

As expected, in HICs both HDI and GDP per capita are positive and significant.
As development increases, the costs associated with organized crime decreases. Polity 2
and durable are also positive and significant, meaning stable democracies are likely to
have low amounts of organized crime.
Model 6.

Ethics and Corruption in High-Income Countries

term

estimate

std_error

intercept
hdi
gdp_per_cap
polity2
durable
population_size

-7.211
13.18
0
-0.077
0.005
0

0.955
1.18
0
0.006
0.001
0

R_squared

0.65

t-statistic
-7.549
11.17
7.03
-13.32
5.003
-6.958

p_value
0
0
0
0
0
0

For ethics and corruption, HDI and GDP per capita are also significant. As HICs
become more developed, levels of corruption become lower. Polity 2 and durable are
again significant, stable democracies should have lower levels of corruption.
The contributions of organized crime laid out in this paper assume the state is
lacking in some aspect which organized crime is able to fill in for. This does not extend
to HICs, as generally countries that have reached the high-income level have functioning
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institutions and the capacity to reach the whole of the population. As such, development
is what effects organized crime, instead of organized crime affecting development.

